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1THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, security has remained a paramount 
concern of Western states in the post-Cold War era. The nature of the current threats 
may have changed but the need to guard against external aggression remains. 
Contemporary threats to security manifest most frequently as the consequences of 
intra-state conflict and international terrorism. Both have human rather than state 
interest at their root and ultimately derive from the desire of certain groups to subvert 
existing state systems and borders. There is a clear causal link between the abuse, or 
perceived abuse, of a group’s human rights and the desire of this group to secede from 
their oppressive host state via the recourse to terrorism or civil war, as evidenced by 
the IRA and ETA. 
           The rights and security of the individual have become primary issues in 
international relations discourse in the post-Cold War era. According to Antonio 
Cassese, ‘It is a truism that today human rights are no longer of exclusive concern to 
the particular state where they may be infringed. Human rights are increasingly 
becoming the main concern of the world community as a whole. There is a 
widespread sense that they cannot, and should not, be trampled upon with impunity in 
any part of the world’.(1999: 26) Rights orientated rhetoric has sought to place the 
rights of the individual above the rights of the state, specifically the tenets of 
sovereignty, and has at its core the principle of humanitarian intervention.(Robertson, 
2002, 433). Intervention necessarily challenges the inviolability of state sovereignty 
and, therefore, increasing the security of the individual seems to be to the detriment of 
the security of the state. Furthermore, interventions for ostensibly humanitarian 
principles in the post-Cold War era have been undertaken primarily by the more 
powerful Western states, or coalitions thereof, and NATO in particular. The rise in 
Western rhetoric regarding ‘moral imperatives’ or ‘duties’ to intervene globally to 
protect certain values has alarmed less powerful states that view this revised 
dispensation as a means to facilitate a new era of colonialism. As Lloyd notes, 
‘Opposition to the war in Kosovo has come most vociferously from those states that 
see universal values not as an expression of human freedom or rights, but as a threat. 
And now they see them as an even greater threat because, for the first time, values 
have been used as the explicit basis for waging war’(1999, 14). The interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the existence of more obvious impulses, were 
legitimised on humanitarian imperatives and further suggested that coalitions built 
around, or exclusively comprising, Western powers were posed to undertake a new 
era of aggressive expansionism under the guise of nation building and 
humanitarianism. The lack of direct intervention in Israel, Chechnya and North Korea, 
similarly points to a selective adherence to ‘universal’ rights and norms based on 
geopolitical agendas. The explicit call for a new era of colonisation made by key 
foreign policy strategists, such as Robert Cooper (2002), and Michael Glennon’s 
assertion that, ‘The West’s new rules of thumb on intervention accord less deference 
to the old idea of sovereign equality…The new posture recognises the hollowness of 
this concept, accepting that all states are not in fact the same in their power, wealth, or 
commitment to human rights’(1999, 4) has generated disquiet as to the emerging 
asymmetrical value system. Chandler, indicative of those academics wary of the new 
dispensation, suggests that, ‘…the sovereignty of some states…is to be limited, that of 
others – the NATO powers – is to be increased under the new order: they are to be 
given the right to intervene at will. It is, in other words, not sovereignty itself but 
2sovereign equality…which is being targeted by the new interventionists’(2000; 55). 
Less powerful states thus perceive the West’s determination to increase its direct 
involvement globally, ostensibly to maintain human rights standards, as a threat to 
their security. 
           The most immediate potential solution to the conflict between the need to 
protect human rights and the need to safeguard against the abuse of this principal as a 
means to facilitate the execution of sectional policy, is to codify means by which such 
interventions could take place and transfer decision making with respect to halting 
human rights violations to an international body. This would insure that human rights 
violations would be addressed, but by an actor with legal legitimacy. Yet, codification 
would necessarily impact on the ability of Western states to carry out their foreign 
policy objectives and institute a legal proscription on certain behaviour. Whereas 
today, powerful Western states can determine that a situation necessitates 
intervention, codification would transfer these decision-making responsibilities to a 
transnational organisation. In addition, such an organisation could determine that 
action should be taken in certain circumstances that conflict with a states foreign 
policy agenda. Therefore, why should powerful Western states support initiatives to 
institute a legal right of intervention? It is the contention of this paper that codification 
of a right of humanitarian intervention would serve to shield these states from 
instability generated by escalating intra-state conflicts and eliminate a major cause of 
international terrorism.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
For the purposes of this examination I define a humanitarian intervention as when a 
state, or group of states, undertakes an unsolicited military intervention in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state with the expressed purpose of achieving exclusively 
humanitarian goals. Thus, this intervention is opposed by the state being intervened 
into, though not necessarily by all factions within the state. 
           In the post-Cold War era intra-state conflicts have become a great source of 
violence and instability and these situations have challenged the international 
community’s ability to maintain peace and protect human rights within sovereign 
states. The rise in the recognition of the rights of the individual and the removal of the 
constraints imposed by bi-polarity, compelled the emergence of a conviction among 
certain elements of the liberal international relations perspective to argue for a 
proactive Western approach to global human rights (Robertson, 2002; Ignatieff, 
2000). Thus, the status of humanitarian intervention has become an increasingly 
important issue in international relations discourse. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
in 1999 ‘brought the controversy to its most intense head’ (International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; VII) and highlighted the gulf between 
contemporary legal doctrine and evolving conceptions of human rights and ethical 
state behaviour. The conclusion reached by the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo is succinctly illustrative of the central problem; ‘The 
Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was illegal but 
legitimate’ (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000; 4).
           International law enshrines the sovereign inviolability of the state. The 
sovereign status of the state has evolved from the principles of the Treaty of 
Westphalia to the explicit provisions codifying sovereignty in the UN Charter. The 
Charter’s codification of the sovereign equality of all its members, as detailed in 
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sovereignty and, according to Chandler, the Charter, ‘…marked, it seemed, the end of 
the Westphalian system of legitimating great power domination through the use of 
force’ (2000; 59).
           Article 2.4 proscribes all UN members from the use of force in their 
international affairs and Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties states that this particular provision is part of jus cogens, and is 
therefore accepted by the international community as a principle from which no 
derogation is permitted. The use of force by states, regardless of the motivation, is 
explicitly proscribed except under two circumstances, namely self-defence, as defined 
under Article 51, which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in the 1986 case 
of The US Vs. Nicaragua should be understood restrictively (Guilcherd, 1999; 21), 
and secondly, to maintain or restore international peace and security as defined under 
Chapter VII.
           Under Article 24 of the Charter member states acknowledge that the Security 
Council has ‘…primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’. The one possible derogation from this rule is the 1950 General Assembly 
Resolution 377, entitled ‘Uniting for Peace’. This resolution theoretically enables the 
General Assembly to act when the Security Council is unable to unanimously sanction 
action when there is a threat to international peace and stability. The Resolution has 
been used on ten occasions and was first used during the Suez Canal crises in 1956. 
However, the lack of effectiveness of this principle was evidenced later that year 
when the General Assembly used this provision to demand that the Soviet Union 
cease its intervention in Hungary to no effect. A two-thirds vote in favour of action 
would, according to the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), ‘…provide a high degree of legitimacy for an intervention 
which subsequently took place, and encourage the Security Council to rethink its 
position’(2000; 53). A ‘high degree of legitimacy’ clearly does not constitute an 
explicit legal endorsement and the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DIIA) 
found that the Uniting for Peace resolution ‘Has lost much of its importance…[and] is 
no legal basis for the authorisation of humanitarian intervention’ (1999; 61).
           In its seminal ruling in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) the ICJ declared that it 
could
only regard the alleged right of [humanitarian] intervention as the 
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to 
most serious abuses and as such cannot, whatever be the present defect in 
international organisation, find a place in international law. 
Intervention… would be reserved for the most powerful states and might 
easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself 
(Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999; 86). 
In 1986 the UK Foreign Office, in its appraisal of the legal status of humanitarian 
intervention, stated that
the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down 
against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention for three 
main reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern 
international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; 
secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 
41945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian 
intervention, and on most assessments, none at all; and finally on 
prudential grounds, that the scope of abusing such a right argues strongly 
against its creation’ (Chandler, 2002; 140-141). 
Thus, under international law there is no legal provision that explicitly sanctions the 
use of force to uphold human rights violations and states are explicitly forbidden from 
unilaterally determining when and where to intervene on humanitarian grounds. 
           Chapter VII of the UN Charter, relating to a threat to international peace and 
security, is one possible legal justification for intervention. However, as the DIIA 
notes
It was hardly the intention of the framers of the Charter that internal 
conflicts and human rights violations should be regarded as a threat to 
international peace. There is no evidence that they might have envisaged 
a competence for the Security Council under Chapter VII to take action 
to cope with situations of humanitarian emergency within a state 
resulting from civil war or systematic repression’ (1999; 62).
Nonetheless, during the 1990’s the definition of a threat to international peace and 
security was stretched to facilitate interventions into situations that, though grave, 
could not reasonably be said to constitute such a threat. The UN approved 
intervention in Haiti in 1994, to oust the military from office and restore democracy, 
was premised on the situation constituting a threat of this magnitude. The declaration 
in this instance widened the definition of a threat to international peace and stability to 
incorporate non-democratic regimes. In practice, as the ongoing situation in Myanmar 
attested, the existence of non-democratic regimes, and benefactors of military coups, 
was not seen in every instance to present this grave threat. In addition, in keeping with 
other declarations of a threat to international peace and stability during the 1990’s, 
this Security Council ruling was officially considered an exception. Resolution 940 
recognised ‘…the unique character’ of the situation and stated that its ‘extraordinary 
nature…[required] an exceptional response’. Similarly, the sanctioning of action on 
the grounds that there was a threat to international peace in Somalia in 1992 was 
premised on it being ‘…an exceptional response’ and the sanctioning of action in 
Rwanda through Resolution 929 in 1994 was ‘…a unique case’.  As the DIIA notes, 
‘This approach reveals unwillingness on the part of the Security Council to set 
precedents for humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts’(1999; 71). The 
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter do enable the Security Council to sanction 
military intervention in intra-state conflicts but not explicitly for humanitarian 
reasons. While the term ‘threat to international peace and stability’ may be malleable, 
and has been questionably broadened to accommodate certain situations, the 
inconsistency of application, the lack of explicit legal authorisation and the reluctance 
to set a precedent when used, mitigates against the provisions of Chapter VII 
constituting a codified legal legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. 
           Catherine Guilcherd noted that during NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia, 
‘The argument [for intervention] was obviously more political then legal’(1999; 19). 
However, certain elements within NATO’s hierarchy did assert a legal justification 
for the intervention. UK Defence Minister George Robertson maintained, ‘We are in 
no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests 
upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert 
5a humanitarian catastrophe’(Chandler, 2002; 141). While suggesting that this 
principle is ‘accepted’ is a political statement and not factually correct, humanitarian 
intervention is certainly not considered illegal by everyone. There are essentially two 
legal justifications that have been articulated regarding the legality of humanitarian 
intervention. Firstly, there is the ‘link theory’ as proffered by Richard Lillich (1967). 
This suggests that, under Article 1.1 of the Charter, UN member states have a 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security and that when the Security 
Council is unable to carry out its assigned duties in this respect, the onus is on 
member states to act and the prohibition on the use of force as outlined in Article 2.4 
is suspended. In its assessment of the merits of the link theory, the DIIA identified 
three flaws. Firstly, there is no explicit basis for this rationale outlined in the Charter. 
Although Article 24 states that the Security Council has primary, rather than 
exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
according to the DIIA, ‘[This] refers to a subsidiary responsibility of other organs of 
the UN, notably the General Assembly, but not of the Members states’ (1999; 82). 
Secondly, it is not legally sound to assert that the Charter must be suspended when the 
Security Council fails to act. There is no legal basis for this assertion. Thirdly, the 
prohibition on the use of force between states is a tenet of customary international law 
and has evolved independently of the UN Charter and therefore ‘…can hardly be 
conditioned upon the effectiveness of collective security under Chapter VII’ (1999; 
82).
           The second suggested justification relates to the customary nature of 
international law. The Paquete Habana Case (1900) established that in addition to 
codified doctrines, treaties and court judgements, international law is based on 
established customary behaviour of states and this principle is codified in Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ. Thus, as the DIIA notes, ‘…the only possible legal 
justification for humanitarian intervention without Security Council mandate is the 
assumption that the practice of states after 1945 has established a right of 
humanitarian intervention as part of customary international law’(1999; 88). 
However, Arendt and Beck analysed interventions during the Cold War period and 
concluded, ‘…between 1945 and 1990 there were no examples of a genuinely 
humanitarian intervention’ and in addition, during this period there was ‘no 
unambiguous case of state reliance on the right of humanitarian intervention’ (1993; 
137). As noted earlier, the UK Foreign Office found in 1986 that no customary norm 
of humanitarian intervention had evolved and the ICISS similarly reported, ‘…the 
many examples of intervention in actual state practice throughout the 20th century did 
not lead to an abandonment of the norm of non-intervention’ (2000; 12). Furthermore, 
according to Holbrook, ‘Those who argue that international law has evolved over the 
last decade to establish or revive a right of humanitarian intervention are reneging on 
the principle that international legal norms can only be formed where there is a 
consensus’ (2002; 143). While North American and European states may assert, at 
least periodically, that such a principle should be taken as having entered customary
international law, the fact that this is opposed by China and Russia, to look only 
within the Security Council, suggests that far from there being agreement as to the 
evolution of a principle, there is active hostility to the development of such a legal 
norm. 
6CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO STATE SECURITY
In 2000 of the 36 wars recorded only the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was 
inter-state in nature (Czempiel, 2004; 80). The ongoing ‘Minorities at Risk Project’ 
found that of the one hundred and ninety states in existence, one hundred and twenty 
had politically significant minorities and that in Eurasia and Africa, thirty countries 
are ‘…at serious risk of violent conflict and instability for the foreseeable future’ 
(Feste, 2003; 9). These findings led Feste to argue that ‘The real political threat to 
stability lies in the structural detachment of populations from their traditional 
dependency on governments and the attendant increases in various kinds of non-
governmental or private initiates that can prove disruptive to social cohesion’ (Ibid, 
11). In essence, international stability is threatened by the consequences of intra-state 
instability. The US National Security Strategy recognised that ‘America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’ (2002; 11). 
           The cycle of violence between separatists and state forces necessarily results in 
loss of civilian life and attendant violations of human rights. Intra-state conflicts have 
the potential to escalate rapidly and engulf neighbours turning an internal crisis into a 
regional conflagration, as evidenced by the ongoing unrest in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The increased economic interdependence of states has meant that 
intra-state conflicts that provoke regional crises can impact on Western foreign 
investment and domestic markets and generate international economic instability in 
addition to political and social disruption. The conflict prevention initiatives in 
Indonesia and Macedonia had at their core this understanding and President Clinton’s 
warning on the eve of the initiation of air strikes against Yugoslavia ‘Let a fire burn 
here and the flames will spread’ (Broder, 1999; A15) has international applicability.   
           The second major contemporary threat to international security is terrorism. 
While terrorism is not a new threat, its magnitude has increased sharply since 
September 11th. The threat posed by international terrorism has risen in the last 
decade as terrorist groups have taken advantage of technological innovations and 
pursued their objectives outside the borders of their host state. The increased 
prominence of international terrorism in Western state security agendas and political 
rhetoric has generated an increased focus on the causes of terrorism and its negative 
implications for state security.
           Both terrorism and intra-state conflicts can loosely be attributed to the same 
source, namely the disjuncture between citizens and the state, or between citizens and 
political systems. Efforts made to date to tackle these threats have taken two forms, 
preventative and confrontational. The preventative approach seeks to tackle the root 
causes via aid and democratisation initiatives while the confrontational approach 
seeks to tackle the terrorist organisations directly by military means and the use of 
coercion. It is my contention that, while there are merits to both approaches, without 
codifying a right of humanitarian intervention, these twin threats will remain and, in 
certain circumstances, increase. 
THE NEED TO CODIFY
The current lack of codified means by which states, coalitions of states or the 
international community as a whole can intervene to prevent the serious violation of 
human rights contributes to the escalation of intra-state conflicts, adds to the attraction 
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Western states. According to the ICISS ‘…the issue of international intervention for 
human protection is a clear and compelling example of concerted action urgently 
being needed to bring international norms and institutions in line with international 
needs and expectations’ (2000; 3). This urgent need should not be seen purely in 
terms of the protection of human rights but as also necessary to protect states from the 
two most pressing threats to their security. 
           Post-Cold War intra-state conflicts have tended to involve a conflict between a 
group, often an ethnic group, seeking to secede and a central administration aiming to 
maintain the territorial integrity of the state, such as Chechnya, Kosovo and Aceh. 
The recourse to violence in the face of state implacability and oppression is common 
and it is these situations that threaten stability beyond the borders of the state. The 
lack of a clear legal means by which secessionists can appeal for intervention to 
counter the abuse of human rights by the host state is directly responsible for what I 
describe as the ‘escalation imperative’. Without recourse to existing legal channels 
governing intervention, secessionists may conclude that the only way to focus 
international attention on their plight is by escalating the conflict and generating those 
features of conflicts that have traditionally provoked international attention, often 
through the media or NGO’s. Thus, the rationale could be crudely described as ‘the 
greater the tragedy the more likely the response’. The most apparent contemporary 
example of this phenomenon is the KLA and the conflict in Kosovo. 
           While undeniably suffering under Miloševic’s regime, the recourse to war by 
the KLA was initially unpopular amongst the Kosovar Albanians who 
overwhelmingly supported the pacifism of Rugova and his LDK party. The rise is 
support for the KLA derived from the growth in frustration at the lack of tangible 
results from Rugova’s tactics, in particular the ignoring of Kosovo in the Dayton 
Accords. According to Hodge, ‘In effect Dayton told autonomists in Kosovo that the 
metal in Kosovo was not hot enough to bring about political change. The KLA 
decided to make it glow’ (2000; 26). Thus, the KLA adopted a strategy, according to 
Gow, of ‘…armed engagement designed to provoke atrocities’ (2003; 256) that would 
generate international attention. The KLA could never hope to defeat the Yugoslav 
army and thus gambled on gaining the support of NATO. The gamble worked and 
NATO intervened on the basis that they had a ‘moral duty’ to do so (Solano, 1999). 
However, this gamble is very risky, both for the architects of the strategy and those 
powers whose support is coveted. 
           Blainey describes the rationale that has prompted separatists to escalate the 
scale of their conflict as ‘optimistic miscalculation’ (Kuperman, 2003; 57). Kuperman 
writes that, ‘…in the post-Cold War era, a main source of such optimistic 
miscalculation has been the expectation by subordinate groups that the ‘international 
community’ will intervene to protect them on humanitarian grounds if their challenge 
to authority provokes retaliatory violence’ (2003; 57). Kuperman’s diagram 
representing the cycle of events typical of certain instances of genocide is illustrative 
of the dangers inherent in the current unregulated system of intervention and his 
findings reflect a problem not so much inherent in the principle of intervention but in 
the current ad hoc nature of intervention: 
8Table 1. ‘How the West Inadvertently Causes Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing’
(Kuperman, 2003; 57)
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The central problem is that the subordinate group believes its only hope of achieving 
its goals is to attract the attention of a Western power through the engineering of a 
humanitarian catastrophe. This presupposes that it is the West alone that determines 
when and how to undertake a humanitarian intervention, which is essentially the case 
under the current unregulated structure. Where separatists’ struggles have been unable 
to provoke an intervention, most notably in Turkey, the consequences are increased 
oppression and the increased polarisation of the groups in dispute. Escalation 
necessarily increases the likelihood of increased violence, which makes the resolution 
of the underlying conflict more difficult and simultaneously increases the chances of 
the conflict spreading beyond the borders of the state.
           The recourse to terrorism is a consequence of both a policy and a fear that 
ultimately derive from individual’s conception of their own security. According to 
Hertz, an important feature of the sustained popularity of the state model is the fact 
that, ‘Throughout history that unit which affords protection and security to human 
beings has tended to become the basic political unit’ (1957; 473). The state has been 
able to provide this necessary protection and security through the shield of 
sovereignty. The state, as it now exists, owes its position of primacy in the 
international system to the Westphalian model of sovereignty and its explicit 
codification under the UN Charter. Bloom’s analysis of the rationale for patriotism in 
the individual asserted that
In order to achieve psychological security every individual possesses an 
inherent drive to internalise - to identify with - the behaviour, mores and 
attitudes of significant figures in his/her social environment; i.e. people 
seek identity...every human being has an inherent drive to enhance and 
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enhance and protect identity’ (Bloom, 1990; 23). 
Individuals, therefore, will align themselves with that group or institution that will 
provide them with the greatest sense of security. The tenets of sovereignty encouraged 
citizens of militarily weak states to entrust their allegiances to that state because of the 
security afforded to all states under international law and the customary practice of 
states. As such, the security of the state could be guaranteed by a legal provision 
rather than by military might, though alliances and treaties were also signed to 
enhance security. The sovereign individual, therefore, gave up elements of his/her 
sovereignty to the sovereign state as a means to allow the state both the internal 
sovereignty it needed to function as a political entity and also to enable the 
preservation of the state in the international arena. 
           In ‘The Anarchical Society’ Bull identified two categories of sovereignty, 
namely internal and external (1977; 8). Internal sovereignty refers to the authority of 
the state being accepted without question by its citizens, which, he argues, was in the 
process of being widely established before Westphalia. Bull maintains it was the 
establishment of external sovereignty that was Treaty’s most important legacy. The 
recognition of the external sovereignty of states meant that no national or international 
entity could legitimately interfere in the activities of another state. The state after 
1648 came to embody both the previous secular and spiritual authority structures in 
Europe and thereafter had this status laid down in international law. The Treaty 
imbued the state with historically unprecedented power and as Weiss and Chopra 
write, ‘…it transferred to nation-states the special godlike features of church 
authority’ (1995; 97). The further codification of the principle in the UN Charter 
served as the final legitimisation of the state model as guarantor of security. Internal 
sovereignty, identified by Bull as the capacity to rule, necessitates the citizenry’s 
acceptance, be it conscious or passive, of the government’s authority (1977, 8). The 
willingness of the citizenry to accede to the states internal sovereignty is, therefore, 
dependant on the state’s ability to meet their basic security requirements. As Kedourie 
writes, ‘The cohesion of the state and loyalty to it, depend on its capacity to ensure the 
welfare of the individual, and in him, love of the fatherland is a function of benefits 
received’ (1971; 12). 
           The present ad hoc interventionist policy adopted and advocated by certain 
Western statesmen significantly weakens the status of sovereignty. In its findings the 
ICISS noted, ‘…even in states where there was the strongest opposition to 
infringements on sovereignty, there was a general acceptance that there must be 
limited exceptions to the non-intervention rule for certain kinds of emergencies’ 
(2000; 31). Thus, it is not necessarily intervention per se that is opposed, but the 
unregulated, and inherently sectional, manner in which it has been pursued in the 
post-Cold War era. According to Pangle and Ahrensdorf  ‘The nation-state is today 
weaker than it has been since 1815, and arguably weaker than it has ever been since 
its first form was established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648’ (1999; 3). The 
selective abandonment of the tenets of sovereignty thus impacts on citizens’ 
perceptions of the state itself. If the state is unable to provide the individual with the 
necessary sense of security from external threat, through the recognition of its 
external sovereignty, then citizens will align themselves with other organisations that 
purport to do so, such as the KLA or AL Qaeda. There is, therefore, a causal link 
between the willingness of citizens from Somalia, Afghanistan and Sudan to join Al 
Qaeda and the fact that these states have lost their sovereign legitimacy and internal 
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cohesion. One way terrorist groups gain support is through the decline in the status of 
state sovereignty and many, most particularly Al Qaeda, have readily adopted the 
mantle of defender against external interference and neo-colonialism. Therefore, 
Western assumptions that human rights are best upheld by recourse to its own military 
might and moral clarity, rather than legal doctrine, have diminuend the status of 
sovereignty and precipitated a shift in allegiances from the state to sub or tran-state 
terrorist groups. 
           The absence of codification and the belief in the ability of the West to regulate 
human rights and intervention policy can therefore be seen to have contributed to, 
though certainly not singularly caused, the escalation of the two most manifest threats 
to state security in the West. Codification of a right of humanitarian intervention 
would remove these contributing factors in the following ways. 
           The absence of a clear means by which groups claiming to be suffering 
oppression can appeal for external assistance has created the escalation imperative 
and its attendant risks. Codification of a mechanism by which an international 
organisation, most suitably the UN, could arbitrate and ultimately determine that 
intervention is warranted would eliminate the need for escalation. The international 
body charged with determining the seriousness of the situation, much like domestic 
judicial institutions, would not be compelled to act only in conscious shocking 
situations. Rather, any instance of human rights violations by an implacable state 
would be impartially addressed without a necessary consideration of scale. 
Provocation, of the type employed by the KLA, would potentially lessen the chances 
of intervention, as this would be judged as an unwarranted contributing factor to the 
crisis at hand. The proposed solution to such a situation may therefore be to tackle the 
insurgents rather than intervene on their behalf. 
           Codification of a right of intervention would impact on the status of 
sovereignty but would not necessarily negate it entirely. If the ICISS findings are 
correct then there is evidence to suggest that absolute sovereignty is not considered 
sacrosanct by states. Sovereignty has periodically been ignored by states pursuing 
their geopolitical aims yet, these instances represented situations determined by 
sectional agendas rather than the expansive liberal ideology of ‘a new kind of 
imperialism’ (Cooper, 2002; 28) which aims to establish a principal of interference 
which necessarily weakens the status of sovereignty. 
           Article 2.7 of the UN Charter suggests, ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state’. The definition of what constitutes domestic 
jurisdiction, however, has changed since the inception of the Charter. The 
evolutionary projection of international law since Nuremberg, in both codified and 
customary terms, has been to decree that there are certain acts that a state cannot 
commit against its own citizens. Paragraph four of The Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action adopted by all UN members in 1993 decrees, ‘…the promotion 
and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international 
community’. This trend, however, has not been accompanied by either a codification, 
or an emergence of a customary practice, of how to ensure compliance with these 
humanitarian standards. Describing this ‘hypocrisy’ in international law Guilcherd 
notes, ‘Despite the now recognised right of victims to assistance, it is not possible to 
derive a right of states to bring this assistance by all means, including force’ (1999; 
23). The ICISS note, ‘…if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in 
conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, then it is unreasonable to expect 
that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity 
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and urgency of these situations’ (2000; 55). At its Fiftieth Anniversary NATO 
announced, ‘Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act 
with such mandates [from the Security Council] they must not limit themselves to 
acting only when such a mandate can be agreed’ (Caplan, 2000; 31). This, therefore, 
signals an emerging commitment to acting outside the UN which increases the 
likelihood of unilateral, and necessarily subjective, determinations of when to 
intervene for the protection of human rights. The ICISS warns, ‘…such interventions 
will not be conducted for the right reasons or with the right commitment to the 
necessary precautionary principles’ (2000; 55). Therefore, an acceptance that certain 
grave violations of human rights are never permissible demands a clarified means by 
which these violations can be halted and the perpetrators punished and thus a 
codification of a right of intervention. To attempt to forge a new age of enforcement 
outside of existing international law is to potentially facilitate spurious humanitarian 
interventions and signal the breakdown of international law specifically as it relates to 
state sovereignty.  
POTENTIAL AMENDMENT
The current corpus of international law, while committed to outlawing the use of force 
in international relations, does permit its use in certain circumstances. These 
acceptable grounds for the use of force, self-defence and when there is a threat to 
international peace and stability, are reactive and premised on they’re being the option 
of last resort. In both circumstances the primacy of the UN is retained. Therefore, 
codification of a right of intervention as a last resort, under the control of the UN, 
would not be a provision wholly out of step with existing provisions relating to the 
use of force. An amendment to the current charter could take the form of detailing the 
procedure when intra-state violations of human rights are of a sufficiently grave 
nature as to necessitate international concern.
           The precise definition of those violations of human rights that would 
necessitate an international response is a contentious issue. Superlatives articulated in 
an attempt to clarify the circumstances under which intervention should take place are 
ultimately unhelpful and do not guard against the potential for abuse through lack of 
clarity. Terminology such as ‘serious, ‘grave, ‘large’, ‘massive’ and ‘terrible’ are of 
little use in the attempt to legally clarify when to intervene. These terms are inherently 
vague and thus open to manipulation.  
           Article 5 of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states, 
‘The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the 
following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide (b) Crimes against humanity (c) War 
crimes (d) Crimes of aggression’. The Preamble of the ICC details it’s commitment to 
working in tandem with the UN and determines that it is concerned only with crimes 
‘…of concern to the international community as a whole’. Thus, there is an explicit 
commitment to the notion of internal sovereignty, as outlined in the UN, with the 
proviso that certain acts are the concern of the international community. These acts 
are then clearly defined in Part II of the Statute. The ICC’s definition of its 
jurisdiction could be made applicable to a definition of the circumstances that would 
trigger international involvement and possibly humanitarian intervention. The 
occurrence of these crimes would need to be verified by an international organisation, 
such as the UN, rather than a regional organisation, NGO or media source. While 
these sources may alert the international body to the occurrence of these crimes, they 
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lack the legitimacy of an international organisation. Verification of the existence of 
these crimes would be crucial and, given the experience in Kosovo, contentious. 
           One necessary addition to the four situations outlined by the ICC would be 
when a state, either by design or incompetence, cannot cope with a humanitarian 
disaster, yet refuses to ask for assistance. For example, if it has been independently 
verified that a famine is ravaging the citizens of a state and the state cannot, or will 
not act, then intervention to alleviate the suffering would be justified. Indeed, General 
Assembly Resolution 43/131, while reaffirming the commitment to sovereignty, 
established the right of victims of humanitarian disasters to international emergency 
relief.
           Upon the acceptance that a crime of the nature described by the ICC, is taking 
place, the international community, through the auspices of the UN, would have the 
right to become involved. The aim, under these circumstances, should be to stop the 
perpetrators committing the serious crime and not to engineer a certain political 
outcome. In keeping with present UN practice, the manner in which the crimes are 
stopped should initially take the form of diplomacy and non-violence. If there is no 
willingness on the part of the perpetrators to cease their activity and all diplomatic 
channels have been exhausted, as verified by the international body, then more 
coercive means would be legitimate. Given the nature of the crimes under 
consideration, it may not be practicable, though not necessarily so, to engage in 
sanctions or other forms of non-violent coercion, though the merits of sanctions 
themselves are questionable (Pape, 1997). If it were determined that there were no 
alternative to intervention then the use of force to halt the prosecution of certain 
serious crimes, as defined above, would be legitimate.
           Humanitarian intervention would thus become a codified and clear element in 
international relations rather than being the contentious legal grey area it is at present. 
The determination of when to intervene would rest with the UN rather than any 
regional coalition or single state. Enshrining a right to intervene in the Charter, using 
the existing template for the use of force, in self-defence and under conditions of a 
threat to international peace and security, would prevent the abuse of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention. Justifying the use of force outside the control of the UN on 
the grounds that the UN lacked the legal mechanisms to deal with a matter of 
immediate humanitarian concern, as was suggested by NATO supporters during 
Operation Allied Force, would no longer be tenable except on the grounds of the 
illegitimate use of the veto.
CONCLUSION: NAÏVE UNIPOLARITY
Opposition to codification, borne out of certain Western statesmen’s belief in their 
right to prosecute their foreign policy as they see fit and their ‘duty’ to uphold 
‘universal’ human rights, is a consequence of the current structure of the international 
political system. As Mastanduno writes, ‘Only the United States excels in military 
power and preparedness, economic and technological capacity, size of population and 
territory, resource endowment, political stability, and ‘soft power’ attributes such as 
ideology. All other would-be great powers are limited or lopsided…Thus many 
commentators and theorists have concluded that the current structure is unipolar’ 
(1999; 41). The unrivalled military and economic power of the United States enables 
it to act without the same restraint that an international actor would observe in a bi-
polar or multi-polar international system. The result, as Johnston argues, is that,
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‘…in the decade following the end of the Cold War, the United States 
largely abandoned a reliance on diplomacy, economic aid, international 
law, and multilateral institutions in carrying out its foreign policies and 
resorted much of the time to bluster, military force, and financial 
manipulation’ (2000; 217). 
The existence of legal vacuums, such as that regarding when and where to intervene 
for humanitarian purposes, present an opportunity, within the context of unipolarity, 
for the formulation of sectional norms and rules. In the context of the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes, the lack of definite legal guidelines can be, and some argue 
has been (Chandler; 2000), exploited by great powers allied to the hegemon, who 
have decreed that they have the moral authority to determine when to act. 
           The history and contemporary status of humanitarian intervention suggests that 
without establishing a legal definition, humanitarian interventions will continue to 
occupy a contentious place in international relations. The incompatibility of the 
codified rights of the individual and the legal status of the sovereign state, and the 
general acceptance that intervention for the purpose of stopping grave violations of 
human rights is permissible under certain circumstances, has created a void within 
contemporary international relations. Justice, in terms of the halting of human rights 
violations, is being prevented both by the existing legal order, through the inviolable 
sovereignty of the state, and the lack of legal order, in terms of the dearth of codified 
means by states can intervene to prevent human rights violations. The current unipolar 
international order is unsuitable to the preservation of justice in respect of 
humanitarian intervention, as intervention will be determined by the status of states 
vis a vis their relationship to the hegemon. The end of bi-polarity removed the 
‘spheres of influence’ and ‘domino theory’ policy platforms from Western foreign 
affairs and thus these variables that acted as constraints on intervention, but also as 
compulsions to intervene, disappeared. As Mastanduno writes, ‘In the unipolar 
structure the international constraints have been lifted, and, in the absence of clear 
signals from the international structure, intervention policy… [has] become more 
haphazard and episodic’ (1999; 144). Therefore, for human rights to be upheld, under 
the current conditions of unipolarity and the lack of clear legal guidelines, justice, that 
is laws and means of enforcement, should take precedence over order, as the current 
order is asymmetrical and based on the hegemon’s unrivalled primacy, rather than on 
any generally accepted rules regarding state behaviour in this area. 
           The fallibilities inherent in adopting a means to intervene on the basis of an ad 
hoc assessment of individual cases determined by the sectional motives of the 
hegemon, and the fact that violations of human rights, universally recognised as 
unacceptable, will continue to receive international attention, argues strongly for the 
clarification of humanitarian intervention in international law. 
           Within the unipolar system, there is an obvious danger that the hegemon will 
determine that it is not only capable of deciding what is permissible, but also that it 
has the moral authority and duty to do so. In February 1998 US Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright defended the use of force against Iraq on the grounds that the US 
was battling tyranny and upholding standards of international law and morality. 
Addressing the opposition voiced against this use of force she declared, ‘If we have to 
use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand 
tall. We see farther into the future’ (Johnston, 2000; 217). Thus, a product of the 
asymmetrical international system is the hegemon’s conviction that’s its position 
imbues it with moral as well as political, economic and military power. This sense of 
indispensability and moral clarity directly impacts on the manner in which the 
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hegemon perceives it’s duty and/or right to intervene. According to Condoleezza Rice 
‘American values are universal’ (2000, 49) and in defence of the intervention in Iraq 
President Bush asserted he was ‘forced to act’ to ‘liberate’ the Iraqi people because 
the US is willing to ‘accept the burden of leadership’ (Borger, 2003: 1). Statements 
such as these indicate that elements within the US political hierarchy are not only 
willing to act on their sense of what is right and wrong, but also that they believe that 
‘American’ conceptions of morality are universal, therefore, opposition to these moral 
principles is borne out of immorality or intellectual short-sightedness rather than any 
genuine cultural or ideological plurality; hence the good versus evil, ‘with us or 
against us’ rhetoric of the Bush administration. As noted by Johnson, ‘A classic 
mistake of empire managers is to come to believe that there is nowhere within their 
domain…in which their presence is not crucial. Sooner or later, it becomes 
psychologically impossible not to insist on involvement everywhere, which is, of 
course, a definition of imperial over-extension’ (2000; 221). Under the conditions of 
unipolarity, therefore, the hegemon will at times seek to intervene when it is not 
warranted or solicited because of both its status within the system and the ideological 
convictions this position imbues it with.         
           The primacy of the hegemon is increased by the need for lesser, but regionally 
major, powers, such as the UK and Japan in this instance, to support the hegemon’s 
global strategy. Thus, a decision by the hegemon to intervene may appear to have 
wider support because dependant powers will support it for geopolitical reasons rather 
than out of conviction. As Mastanduno writes, 
‘Multilateral decision-making processes help the United States to exercise 
its dominant power with legitimacy. They are key instruments of states 
craft – indeed of realpolitik – for a dominant state that is seeking, in a 
unipolar setting, to convince other states to cooperate with it rather than to 
balance against it’ (1999; 157). 
In light of this, to avoid partisan conceptions of what is legitimate and what is moral, 
which will always favour the hegemon in conditions of unipolarity, a legal 
codification of international relations norms is necessary. While there is no guarantee 
that a hegemon will observe the law, legal codification will guard against the 
emergence of customary international law on the basis of sectional hegemonic state 
practice. International laws do not simply emerge from within a unipolar system 
without some concessions to the structure. Thus, it would be naïve to believe that a 
law could be ratified without having the consent of the hegemon and its supporters 
and thus be consistent with the hegemon’s global strategy. However, the gulf between 
what is the right thing to do and what is likely to happen is not of primary importance. 
If it can be asserted that codification is the best way to regulate intervention then the 
fact that this regulation is unlikely to happen under the prevailing international 
systemic conditions does not, of itself, negate the validity of the need for codification, 
rather it merely underlines the inherent asymmetry of the system.           
           International law is, according to Russet and Starr, ‘…merely a magnifying 
mirror that faithfully and cruelly reflects the realities of world politics’ (1995; 301). 
The existence of laws does not prevent unipolar bullying whereby the hegemon 
determines the order that prevails. As evidenced by the impotence of the UN and the 
ICJ in the face of the bi-polar system during the Cold War and, albeit possibly to a 
lesser degree, the unipolar system after, the status of states determines their adherence 
to international law. As the DIIA notes, ‘States are attracted to international law by 
the expectation that it will further their interests’ (1999; 20). Therefore, the twin goals 
of codifying humanitarian intervention in international law, that of preventing the 
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violation of certain human rights and preventing unwarranted external interference in 
sovereign states, is ultimately constrained by the current conditions of unipolarity. 
However, as Starr asserts, ‘…obedience to international law or the self constraint of 
states is based on the basic principle of reciprocity and precedent…International law 
is based on a ‘golden rule’ principle – rule-based behaviour to others will beget rule-
based behaviour, whereas defection or non compliance will beget non 
compliance’(2002; 301). The abandonment of the hegemon’s adherence to the norms 
and laws of international relations will be reciprocated throughout the system 
inevitably destabilising it and ultimately impinging on the hegemon’s security. 
           As noted by Layne (1993) expansive unilateralism executed by the hegemon 
during the period of unipolarity will necessarily increase the likelihood of the 
hegemon’s decline by precipitating the rise of opposing coalitions determined to 
subvert the unipolar structure. Thus, exploiting the lack of legal guidelines, and 
ignoring those that do exist, will have negative consequences for the perpetrator. 
Western attempts to dominate the growing dispensation towards protecting human 
rights through the forcible imposition of its subjective moral agenda will inevitably
encounter opposition from rival, though currently lesser, powers, increase the 
likelihood of the escalation imperative among secessionists, and encourage the 
diminution of sovereignty and the recourse to sub state and tran-state terrorist groups. 
There is thus a need for the realisation amongst advocates of unregulated expansive 
Western interventionism that while there is no immediate need, or coercive 
compulsion, to obey or create international law regarding humanitarian intervention, 
the consequences of not doing so will necessarily impact on Western state security. 
As Guilcherd notes, ‘Unless intervention is regulated by a strict checklist of criteria 
…one risks enhancing the danger of confrontation between power blocks and 
increasing world anarchy’ (1999; 25). Therefore, Western humanitarian intervention 
per se is not inherently destabilising; unilateralism and disregarding international law 
is. 
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